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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case & Proceedings 
Plaintiff/Appellant Steven Cummings' ("Cummings") seeks to hold a title company, 
DefendantlRcspondentiCross-Appellant, Northern Title Company of Idaho, Inc. ("Northern 
Title"), liable for a deed description. The subject property is located in Bear Lake County, 
Idaho. The seller was the Roger L. and Barbara L. Stephens Family Trust, and the buyer was 
Cummings. The realtors were Dorothy Julian and Evan Skinner, neither of which are parties to 
this action. Pursuant to I.e. § 41-2702, Northern Title is the agent of Stewart Title Guaranty 
Company, a Texas corporation from whom Cummings obtained title insurance. 
Cummings' Complaint was filed on July 29,2009. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 1-8. Over two 
years later, Cummings filed his First A.mended Complaint, and shortly thereafter filed his Second 
A.mended Complaint. See R., Vol. 3, pp. 445-520; Id. at pp. 574-649. Cummings brought nine 
(9) causes of action against Northern Title, including (1) Breach of Warranty, (2) Conversion, (3) 
Slander of Title, (4) Breach of Contract, (5) Per Se Violations of the Idaho Escrow Act, (6) 
Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (7) Negligence or Gross Negligence, (8) Breach 
oflnsurance Policy Agreement, and (9) Intliction of Emotional Distress. Id. at Vol. 4, pp. 574-
649. 
The case went to trial, and after Cummings rested his case, the district court granted 
Northern Title's request to dismiss Counts I and II for Breach of Warranty and Conversion. See 
R., Vol. 8, p. 1589. After trial was completed, the district court dismissed five (5) more of 
Cummings' claims against Northern Title. Id. at Vol. 8, p. 1635. In the end, the district court 
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could not find any damages against Northern Title, except for one claim based on Northern 
Title's negligence in drafting the deed description. Id. at Vol. 8, p. 1629. Notwithstanding, based 
on Cummings' one successful claim, the district court deemed Cummings the prevailing party, 
and ordered Northern Title to pay all of Cummings' attorney's fees. See R., Vol. 9, pp. 1805-
1806; Id. at Vol. 9,1809-1812. 
Concise Statement of Facts 
On July 5, 2007, Three Bar Ranches, Inc. ("Three Bar") entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "REPC") with the Roger L. and Barbara L. Stephens Family 
Trust ("Stephens Trust"). See Trial Ex. 29. 1 The REPC did not contain a legal description. See 
Tr., Vol. 1, 515:9-12 (first deed description appeared with Northern Title's title commitment, 
"received from the [Preston, Idaho] title officer on July 26th, 2007"). 
On July 22,2007, Cummings called a listed realtor, Dorothy Julian ('Julian"), to inquire 
about the property; he was eventually forwarded to another realtor, Evan Skinner ("Skinner"). 
See R., Vol. 8, p. 1593, ~~ 10-12. By July 26,2007, Cummings decided to purchase the REPC 
from Three Bar.ld. at Vol. 8, p. 1595, ~ 24. That same day, Cummings contacted Julian by 
telephone, and she faxed him the REPC. Tr., Vol. 1,61 :4-10 and 62: 10-13; see also Trial Ex. 29. 
After receiving the REPC, Cummings called the realtors back, and "demanded" a legal 
description, referred to in the REPC as "Addendum One." Tr., Vol. 1,63: 1-16. 
1 See also "Counter Offer # One" attached thereto, naming "Seller" as "Stephens Family Trust," 
and amending sales price to from $900,000 to $800,000. 
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As a result, on July 26,2007, Northern Title produced the first title commitment "under 
pressure." See Tr., Vol. I, 390: 10-12. Prior to July 26, 2007, Northern Title did not have a title 
commitment ready. Id. 515:9-12. The title commitment was "the first commitment for title 
insurance ... received from the title officer on July 26th, 2007." Id. at 519: 10-13. Specifically, 
on July 16,2007, Skinner verbally requested Northern Title for a commitment, stating "I would 
like to open title on a ranch, the Stephens Ranch, for the buyer to be determined." Id. at 516:9-
11. As a result, Northern Title created order number NTBL-1183. Id. at 376: 18-377:3; see also 
Trial Ex. 110. That same day, Northern Title also created its "PR instructions." Id. at 374:8-19. 
Per Northern Title, "the title officer would compile [the PR instructions] to hand to a processor 
to start the processing of the commitment." Id. The processor and title officer would then "put 
together a draft of a commitment." Id. at 375:3-8. 
Northern Title provided Skinner with the title commitment, and Skinner then faxed it to 
Cummings who by that time was in Utah. Tr., Vol. 1,815:5-12; see also Trial Ex. 35. With that 
title commitment, Skinner also faxed to Cummings a new, unsigned Real Estate Purchase and 
Sale Agreement ("Skinner's REPC"), attaching thereto a copy of Northern Title's title 
commitment. Id. at 815:5-12; see also Trial Ex. 35; see also R., Vol. 8, p. 1594, <JI 16. The deed 
description contained in Skinner's REPC was identical to the deed description contained in 
Northern Title's title commitment. See Vol. 8, p. 1594, <JI 17. 
Back in Utah, Cummings did his own "rough" plot using Northern Title's title 
commitment. See Tr., p. 280, L. 9-12. According to Cummings, his reliance was based on 
Northern Title's duties as a title insurer: 
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When it goes to a title company, that's where it gets verified. Everything 
gets taken care of. Through all my years of real estate, I have never done 
it on my own. I do that on my own personal to get a comf0l1 level with 
my due diligence, but I most certainly do not take that upon myself. That 
is a title company's function. Otherwise, why would we even have title 
insurance companies ... [that is] [w]hat I have always relied on a title 
insurance company for. 
Tr., Vol. 1,277:15-278:2 (emphasis added). Based on his analysis of Northern Title's deed 
description, Cummings "believed" that the sale included property on both the west and the east 
sides of Highway 30. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1594, ~ 21. Notwithstanding, Cummings did not obtain 
an appraisal; Cummings did not obtain a survey; and Cummings did not verify the total acreage. 
Id. at 187:17-188:12; see also id. at 214:24-215:4. Prior to closing, Cummings also never spoke 
to Three Bar, or either of the Stephens Trustees. See Id. at 187: 17 -188: 12. Nor did he ever 
discuss the deed description with Northern Title. Id. at 281 :7-14; see also id. at 298: 22-299: 14 
(post-closing to address quitclaim deed to family trust). 
Contrary to Cummings' alleged belief, everyone else knew that the sale only included 
property west of Highway 30. The district court expressly held that "[tJhe Stephens had no 
intention to sell their property located on the east side of the highway." R., Vol. 8, p. 1592, ~ 2. 
Northern Title understood the same. Id. at Vol. 8, p. 1593, ~ 8. Both the realtors, Julian and 
Skinner, understood the same. See Tr., Vol. I, 817:3-818: 11; see also Julian Published Depo., 
20: 13-20,21: 14-17, 36: 15-22, 38: 16-24, and 40: 1-41 :3. 
On or about July 31, 2007, Northern Title learned that its title commitment erroneously 
included property east of the Highway. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1595, ~ 26; see also Tr., p. 519, L. 12-
p. 520, L. 2. Therefore, Northern Title called the realtors, informed them of the error, and faxed 
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down an amended title commitment. See Tr., Vol. 1,520:17-521:9. The deed description 
contained in this second title commitment was utilized at closing. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1595,11 28. 
However, Cummings testified that he never received from the realtors the updated title 
commitment, and he failed to read the deed description at closing. See Tr., Vol. 1, 94:5-6 (only 
aware of first title commitment); see also id. at 220:25-221: 10 (Cummings does not dispute 
second title commitment deed description used at closing); see also id. at 88:4-19 (Cummings 
did "cursory review" of closing documents). 
In providing the second title commitment, with its amended deed description, Northern 
Title was relying upon the Realtors, with whom Cummings admits he solely dealt: 
Q: All right. During the period of the transaction, did you have any 
direct contact with Mr. Stephens, the Seller? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you have any direct contact with any of the principals for 
Three Bar Ranches? 
A: No. 
Q: So all your negotiations with them were though - was it Evan 
Skinner? 
A: Yes. 
Tr., Vol. 1,98:21-99:5; see also id. at 187:17-188:2; see also id. at 210:2-12. Similarly in 
obtaining the legal description, Cummings testified: 
Q: The legal description is one of the documents - one of the three or four 
documents you were asking for? 
A: That's correct. 
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Q: And you continued to follow up with the realtors in that regard? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: But at this point in time you had not correspondence with Northern Title? 
A: At this juncture? 
Q: Yes. 
A: I do not believe so. 
Tr., Vol. 1,31 I :9-20. Cummings also used the realtors in determining acreage. [d. at 214:20-21. 
Further, Cummings received the title commitment from the realtors, not Northern Title. Id. at 
187:21-23. 
The realtors had specifically instructed Northern Title that the sale included only that 
property west of Highway 30: 
But we sent it [the first title commitment] out, and a few days later, after 
the weekend, Dorothy Julian came into my office, and she walked right in, 
and she knocked on my desktop, and she said -- dropped it on the desktop, 
and she said, "Does this description except out the east side of the 
highway?" And I looked at it, and I told her, "I will call the title officer." 
And she was standing there, I called the title officer. She went over it. 
Barbara [the title officer] said, "No, It's missing. I need to get that put in. 
I'll put it in and get it sent back out." So she sent back out an updated title 
commitment. 
Tr., Vol. 1,518:13-25; see also R., Vol. 8, p. 1593,1111 8-9. Through these instructions, 
"Northern Title had the understanding all along that the sale was to include only that property on 
the west side of Highway 30." R., Vol. 8, pp. 1611-1612. 
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However, the deed description used at the August 3,2007 closing still erroneously 
included the Lui's property, as well as 83 acres of the Stephens Family Trust east of the 
Highway. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1595, ~ 27; see also See Tr., Vol. 1,543: 10-14. On November 8, 
2007, Roger Stephens, Trustee of the Stephens Family Trust, informed Northern Title of the 
inadvertent error. Id. at 1596, ~ 34. Prior to this time, Northern Title had been trying for months 
to get in touch with Cummings regarding his request to quitclaim the property into his own 
family trust. See Tr., Vol. 1,530: 16-25. Notwithstanding, Northern Title strove again to get in 
touch with Cummings prior to filing a correction deed. Id. at 537:8-13; see also id. at 538: 14-23 
(tried several times, left message for Cummings, did not hear back for three months); see also R., 
Vol. 8, p. 1596, ~ 37 (Northern Title tried to let Cummings know "that Northern Title was 
changing the legal description ... but was only able to leave a voicemail"). 
Under the Escrow General Provisions, Cummings was required to "cooperate and adjust 
clerical errors, and or further documentation which may be deemed necessary to comply with 
any Real Estate Purchase Contract governing this transaction or it's [sic] intent." See Escrow 
General Provisions, Trial Ex. 111, ~ 20. Cummings, however, must have known his alleged 
"belief' regarding the eastern property was an outlier. In addition to getting voicemails from 
Northern Title, Cummings admits "I received a message from Stephens that changes were made 
to the Warranty Deed." Tr., Vol. 1, 322:9-11; see also Cummings' Affidavit, Trial Ex. 49, ~ 6. 
Specifically, by letter Roger Stephens told Cummings "I had to go to Northern Title and found 
that they had made a mistake on the land description .... " Tr., Vol. 1, 342: 12-16; see also 
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Stephen's Nov. 27. 2007 Ltr., Trial Ex. 21. However, Cummings did not respond to Stephens. 
Nor did Cummings seek out the realtors. Nor did Cummings respond to Northern Title. 
Rather, Cummings located someone he had never spoken with: Curtis Baum of Three 
Bar. See Tr., 187:2-13; see also id. at 187:17-188:12. Cummings sought out Baum to allegedly 
"get clarity on what the agreement between the buyer and the seller was." ld. at 324:3-7. Two 
months after meeting with Baum, Cummings by letter finally responded to Northern Title, but 
made no mention of the corrected warranty deed. ld. at 531 :21-24; see also Trial Ex. 41. Later 
on March 27, 2008, Cummings by letter again communicated, but demanded only his policy, and 
made no mention of the corrected warranty deed. See Trial Ex. 43. 
Cummings conduct was beyond coy. He testifies "I clearly knew" about the changed 
legal description. See Tr., VoL 1,326:22-327:5. He also testifies that if given the chance, he 
would claim recovery for all of the property included in Northern Title's erroneous title 
commitment, even that property never owned by the Stephens Family Trust.ld. at 542:7-20 
(deed description relied upon by Cummings included Romrell and Lui properties); see also id. at 
275:21-276:10 (Cummings did not notice Romrell and Lui properties in deed description); id. at 
277 :2-10 (Cummings expects title insurance to cover Romrell and Lui properties). 
For over four years, Cummings has endeavored to obtain damages for a correction deed; 
a correction deed filed and expressly authorized by Northern Title's escrow instructions. 
Notwithstanding, because Cummings' had relied upon Northern Title's title commitment, the 
district court awarded damages against Northern Title in violation of the Anderson rule. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the district court's finding of negligence and damages against Northern 
Title should be reversed, where Northern Title's deed description was provided to further title 
insurance, and Cummings reliance thereon was in violation of the Anderson rule. 
Standard of Review: "Whether a duty exists is a question of law, over which this 
Court exercises free review." Gagnon v. Western Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., 155 Idaho 112,306 
P.3d 197,200 (2013). 
2. Whether the district court's award of damages should be reversed, where (1) the 
district court's ability to calculate damages was limited to the entire assignment purchase price; 
where (2) Cummings' negligence was far greater than Northern Title's, and where (3) Cummings 
failed to mitigate. 
Standard of Review: This "Court reviews a district court's determination of damages 
pursuant to a clearly erroneous standard." Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 
529,248 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2011) (citations omitted). An amount of damages will be affirmed 
only when supported by "substantial and competent" evidence. See Printcraft Press, Inc. v. 
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 457, 283 P.3d 757, 774 (2012); see also 
Weatherhead v. Griffin, 123 Idaho 697, 706, 851 P.2d 993,1002 (Ct. App. 1992). Similarly, the 
finding of contributory negligence and/or mitigation is a question of fact, requiring substantial 
and competent evidence. See Collins v. Collins, 130 Idaho 705, 710, 946 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. 
App. 1997); see also See Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. LipSkY, 123 Idaho 253, 261, 846 P.2d 904, 
912 (1993). 
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3. Whether the district court's finding of gross negligence and willful misconduct 
against Northern Title should be reversed, where the Escrow General Provisions authorized 
Northern Title to record a correction deed that comported with the realtors' instructions. 
Standard of Review: "When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its 
interpretation and legal effect are questions of law." Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 716, 723, 291 P.3d 399, 406 (2012). This Court exercises 
"free review" over questions oflaw. Gagnon, 155 Idaho 112,306 P.3d at 200. 
4. Whether the district court's award of attorney fees and costs should be reversed, 
where Northern Title prevailed in whole or in part at trial. 
Standard of Review: The determination of a prevailing party is "committed to the 
discretion of the district court and we review the determination on an abuse of discretion 
standard." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-
719, 117 P.3d 130, 132-133 (2005). Similarly, the apportionment of any fees is reviewed under 
the abuse of discretion standard. See Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 192, 1941 P.3d 1107, 1112 
(2008). 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 35(g) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Cross-Appellant Northern Title 
hereby incorporates by reference the Response Brief of Northern Title Company of Idaho, Inc., 
specifically those arguments set forth supporting an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Should Cross-Appellant Northern Title prevail on appeal, fees and costs are proper pursuant to 
I.e. § 12-120(3), or pursuant to the Escrow General Provisions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CUMMINGS' RELIANCE ON NORTHERN TITLE'S TITLE 
COMMITMENT, FORMING HIS ALLEGED "BELIEF," VIOLATES THE 
ANDERSON RULE AND THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE PARTIES' 
AGREEMENTS. 
"It has long been the rule in Idaho that only abstractors of title may be found negligent." 
Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 60, 764 P.2d 423, 427 
(1988). This "Court has never deviated from this rule." Id (emphasis added). Additionally, the 
court "by construction cannot create a liability not assumed ... nor make a new contract for the 
parties ... nor add words to the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability." 
Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 878-879, 655 P.2d 82, 85-86 (1982) (quoting with 
approval Thomas v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Idaho, Inc., 82 Idaho 314, 318, 353 
P.2d 776, 778 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
Here, the district court's imposition of negligence liability on Northern Title violated the 
Anderson rule: 2 
Cummings used the legal description in the July 26, 2007 fax from 
Skinner to do a cursory review of the Stephens property and used this 
legal description as part of his basis in believing that he was entering into 
a transaction that included the entire Stephens Ranch, both property in the 
east and west sides of the highway. 
2 The district court was informed regarding the impropriety of Cummings' reliance on Northern 
Title's deed description. See R, Vol. 4, pp. 744-746 (NT's Second Motion in Limine); Id. at Vol. 
5, pp. 767-769 (Memo. in Supp. of NT's Second Motion in Limine); see id. at Vol. 2, pp. 311-314 
(Minute Order & Entry, district court fails to rule on Northern Title's Second Motion in Limine). 
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Cummings was willing to pay an additional $50,000 and purchase an 
assignment from the Baums in order to purchase what he believed was the 
entire Stephens ranch situated on both sides of the highway. This belief 
came based upon the negligent preparation of the legal description by 
Northern Title that identified land on the east side of the highway. The 
only harm that the Court can conclude is outside the realm of speculation 
is that Cummings has been proximately harmed by this negligence in the 
amount of $50,000. 
R., Vol. 8, p. 1594 (par. 21), and p. 1629. 
A. Cummings' reliance on Northern Title's deed description violates the 
Anderson rule, where Northern Title created and provided the title 
commitment to further title insurance. 
"It has long been the rule in Idaho that only abstractors of title may be found negligent." 
Brown's Tie & Lumber Co., 115 Idaho at 60,764 P.2d at 427. "To fall outside the rule ... it 
must be shown that the act complained of was a direct result of duties voluntarily assumed by the 
insurer in addition to the mere contract to insure title." Id. at 115 Idaho at 59, 764 P.2d at 426 
(emphasis added). 
In Anderson v. Title Insurance Compan}', Anderson worked with the insurer's agent 
"Fremont" to purchase a title policy from "Title Insurance Company." See Anderson, 103 Idaho 
at 876,655 P.2d at 83. Prior to the issuance of the policy, Fremont gave Anderson a preliminary 
title report upon which he relied. Id. After the sale, Idaho Fish and Game asserted its right to a 
portion of the land that Fremont neglected to exclude from its title report. Anderson argued that 
a "purchaser is relying on the title insurer in the same manner in which he would rely on an 
abstractor of title and therefore the insurer has the same obligation as an abstractor and is liable 
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in tort for errors or omissions."!d. The Anderson Court rejected this argument, refusing to 
impose the liabilities of an abstractor. See Anderson, 103 Idaho at 879, 655 P.2d at 86. 
Six years later in Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, the Court 
reaffirmed Anderson.:I There, the insurer's agent ("Local") twice misrepresented the status of the 
property. Specifically, the seller had defaulted, after which the buyer moved to foreclose. See 
Brown's Tie & Lumber Co., 115 Idaho at 57,764 P.2d at 424. As a condition to cure, the seller 
agreed to remove all encumbrances. Id. The buyer sought an updated encumbrance report from 
Local, and Local negligently reported there were no encumbrances. Id. One month later, the 
seller defaulted again, and the buyer again moved to foreclose. Id. Local provided a written 
commitment, again negligently reporting no encumbrances. Id. On appeal, the Court rejected 
the seller's reliance on the title commitment, holding that to fall outside Anderson, reliance must 
be "a direct result of duties voluntarily assumed by the insurer in addition to the mere contract to 
insure title." Brown's Tie & Lumber Company, 115 Idaho at 59, 764 P.2d at 426. 
Northern Title's deed description, upon which Cummings relied, was to facilitate title 
insurance. On July 16,2007, Skinner told Northern Title "I would like to open title on a ranch, 
the Stephens Ranch, for the buyer to be determined." Tr., Vol. 1, 516:9-11. As a result of 
Skinner's verbal order, Northern Title created order number NTBL-l183.ld. 376:18-377:3; see 
also Trial Ex. 110. That same day, Northern Title created its "PR instructions." Id. at 374:8-19. 
Thornock explains, "the title officer would compile [the PR instructions] to hand to a processor 
3 The Court further held that Idaho Code section 41-2708(1) "does not create a duty in tort upon 
the part of the title insurers to conduct a reasonable search and inspection of title." Id. at 115 
Idaho at 60, 764 P.2d at 427 (a question previously left open in Anderson) 
CROSS APPELLANT NORTHERN TITLE - 13 
to start the processing of the commitment." [d. The processor and tile officer would then "put 
together a draft of a commitment." [d. at 375:3-8. 
Six (6) days after Skinner's verbal order, Cummings saw the property for sale, and 
contacted Julian. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1593, ~ 10. On July 26,2007, Cummings contacted Julian by 
telephone, and she faxed him the REPC. See Tr., Vol. 1, 61 :4-10; see also id. at 62: 1 0-13; see 
also Trial Ex. 29. After receiving that REPC, Cummings called the Realtors back and 
"demanded" a legal description, or an "Addendum One." [d. at 63: I -16. Prior to July 26, 2007, 
Northern Title did not have a title commitment with deed description ready. [d. at 515:9-12; see 
also id. at 519: 10-13. That same day however, July 26, 2007, Northern Title was able to produce 
its first title commitment, "under pressure." [d. at 390: 10-12. Northern Title provided Skinner 
with the title commitment, and Skinner then faxed it to Cummings. Id. at 815:5-124; see also 
Trial Ex. 35. 
Cummings testified that this fax, Exhibit 35, contained the only deed description he ever 
saw. See Tr., Vol. 1,94:3-9. Exhibit 35 contains an unsigned REPC, i.e. Skinner's REPC, and 
Northern Title's title commitment. See Trial Ex. 35. Skinner admits filled out this REPC, and 
Cummings then initialed such, including the new "Addendum One." See Tr., Vol. 1,64:5-24 
(confirming Ex. 35 was faxed to Cummings on July 26, 2007); see also id. at 65: 16-66:9. There 
is no dispute that Addendum One contains the exact same legal description as Northern Title's 
title commitment. Tr., Vol. 1, 66:21-67 :6. However, no testimony was ever introduced that 
4 Testifying specifically regarding the title commitment contained within Exhibit 35. 
CROSS APPELLANT NORTHERN TITLE - 14 
Northern Title added "Addendum One" to Skinner's REPC. Skinner admitted the "Addendum 
One" written in the REPC was his handwriting, and Thornock testified that Northern Title 
doesn't put "Addendum One" on its deed descriptions. See Tr., Vol. 1, 806:23-25; see also id. at 
819:6-13; see also id. at 391 :6-9. Indeed, looking closely at this "Addendum One," such is a 
literal copy of Northern Title's title commitment deed description, being the only page in 
Skinner's REPC that also contains Northern Title's facsimile identifiers, "2088470881." See Tr., 
Vol. 1,397: 10-14. It is patently clear that Northern Title's deed description was copied and 
placed in Skinner's REPC with a handwritten "Addendum One" by Skinner, not Northern Title. 
See Ex. 35. 
Receiving the fax back in Utah, Cummings relied on that legal description, and 
therefrom, allegedly believed that the sale included property east of Highway 30. See Tr., Vol. 1, 
238:21-239:22. Based on this, the district court held Northern Title liable, holding that 
Cummings' "belief came based upon the negligent preparation of the legal description by 
Northern Title ... [and] Cummings has been proximately harmed by this negligence .... " R., 
Vol. 8, 1629. 
Therefore, the question is whether that deed description "was a direct result of duties 
voluntarily assumed by the insurer in addition to the mere contract to insure title." Brown's Tie 
& Lumber Company, 115 Idaho at 59, 764 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added). Clearly it was not. By 
July 26, 2007, Northern Title and Cummings had never even met, and Cummings obtained the 
legal description solely through the Realtors. See Tr., Vol. 1,311:9-20. Second, Northern Title 
expressly testified that the deed description was to facilitate title insurance, stating "the first 
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commitment for title insurance ... [was] received from the title officer on July 26th, 2007." ld. 
at p. 519, L 1 0-13 (emphasis added). Third, the very testimony relied upon by the district court5 
in holding Northern Title liable contrary to the Anderson rule6 makes clear that the legal 
description was solely to facilitate title commitment: 
Q: And then when you get the contract, do you then send it to 
the title department? 
A: Yes. We can send it to the title department We can give 
them the information. They'll update the commitment 
Q: Okay. Somebody there at the company opens the order, 
and then they're supposed to send the real estate purchase -
the full real estate purchase agreement to the title 
department; right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that would - I'm assuming would assume - wouldn't 
that include the legal description that the parties agreed 
upon? 
A: If it was provided. 
Q: Okay. So when did you get it? 
A: We didn't get it It was generated by us when we produced 
the title commitment on July 26th under pressure. 
Q: Now, this Addendum 1 was in your records; correct? 
A: It would be in my records as part of the commitment 
5 See R., Vol. 8, p. 1622, fn. 119 (district Court citing trial testimony of "387:24-391: 16"). 
6 See R., Vol. 8, p. 1593, 11 6 (finding "Northern Title was responsible for preparing the legal 
description that the parties would use in the real estate transaction"). 
CROSS APPELLANT NORTHERN TITLE - 16 
Q: Who prepared this document? Do you know? 
A: The title officer. 
Q: You're saying that the title officer prepared this Exhibit A? 
A: She prepared Exhibit A. 
Q: Okay. And so that says Addendum 1 on it? 
A: She didn't write Addendum Ion. Our commitments come 
with Exhibit A. 
Q: You're saying this is part of a commitment? 
A: This was part of the commitment. The first one that we 
produced for Three Bar Ranches. 
Tr., Vol. 1,387:24-391:16 (emphasis added). 
Perhaps the trial court found the above testimony convincing, because it regards finding 
an "Addendum 1" in "my [Thornock's] file." Tr., Vol. 1,387:23; see also Ex. 105. But of course 
it would be in Thornock's file, where she was the managing escrow officer. See Tr., Vol. 1, 
370:9-11. Being an escrow, however, does not make Northern Title an abstractor. For instance 
in Brown '5 Tie & Lumber Company, the insurer's agent was not held liable as an abstractor, even 
though it was acting in the joint capacities of an insurer's agent, deed trustee, and "closing 
agent." 115 Idaho at 59, 764 P.2d at 426. Similarly here, the fact Northern Title was the escrow, 
and that the parties elected to use Northern Title's legal description, does not transmute Northern 
Title into their abstractor. 
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While Northern Title sent the realtors a deed description, which the parties opted to use at 
closing, the record clearly shows that Northern Title made that deed description to facilitate title 
insurance. As such, Cummings' reliance thereon was misplaced, and the district court's order 
imposing negligence liability and damages upon Northern Title should be reversed. 
B. The district court's imposition of liability against Northern Title runs 
contrary to the terms of the title commitment and the escrow agreement. 
The duties of an insurer's agent, and those of an escrow, are governed by contract. A title 
company is not impliedly an abstractor of title. See Brown's Tie & Lumber Co., 115 Idaho at 60, 
764 P.2d at 427 (holding I.e. § 41-2708(1) does not create a duty on title insurers to conduct a 
reasonable search and inspection of title"). Rather per Anderson, "[p ]olicies of insurance, as 
other contracts, are to be construed in their ordinary meaning and where the language employed 
is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to construe a policy other than the meaning as 
determined from the plain wording therein." Anderson, 103 Idaho at 878-879, 655 P.2d at 85-86. 
Similarly as a closing agent, the "[d]uties of an escrow holder are those set out in the escrow 
agreement." Foreman v. Todd, 83 Idaho 482, 486, 364 P.2d 365, 367 (1961) (holding escrow 
agent not liable for defects in title). 
The district court's findings are directly contrary to the terms of Northern Title's title 
commitment and escrow agreement. While the district court held "Northern Title was 
responsible for preparing the legal description that the parties would use in the real estate 
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transaction,,,7 the title commitment and escrow agreement both made clear that Northern Title 
was not their abstractor: 
This Commitment is a contract to issue one or more title insurance policies 
and is not an abstract of title or a report of the condition of title. 
Trial Ex. 35; see also Trial Ex. 10, bates-stamped 0009, <IT 4 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Northern Title's escrow agreement states: 
The undersigned Buyer and Seller affirm that the legal description 
appearing in the commitment is satisfactory. 
The undersigned buyers and sellers hereby acknowledge that they have 
[chosen not to] have a survey completed ... affirm that the legal 
description on the title documents of even date herewith is satisfactory, 
and the undersigned herein agree to hold NORTHERN TITLE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO and the undersigned Real Estate Company 
harmless as to any dispute resulting from not having a survey done at the 
time of the transaction. 
Trial Ex. 111, <IT<IT II, 14 (emphasis in original; brackets added). 
Per the reasoning in Anderson, a district court "cannot create a liability not assumed ... 
nor make a new contract for the parties ... nor add words to the contract of insurance to either 
create or avoid liability." Anderson, 103 Idaho at 878-879, 655 P.2d at 85-86 (quoting with 
approval ThOlnas, 82 Idaho at 318,353 P.2d at 778) (emphasis added). Further as explained by 
the Boel v. Stewart Title Company Court, the "intent of the parties should, if possible, be 
ascertained from the language of the documents." Boel, 137 Idaho 9, 13,43 P.3d 768, 779 (2002) 
(citation omitted). Here as evidenced by the contractual documents, Northern Title clearly did 
not intend to be an abstractor, and that intent was ascertainable from the plain language of the 
7 R., Vol. 8, 1593, <IT 6. 
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documents. Under well-established law, contracts "are to be construed in their ordinary meaning 
and where the language employed is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to construe a 
policy other than the meaning as determined from the plain wording therein." Anderson, 103 
Idaho at 878-879,655 P.2d at 85-86. 
In order to find Northern Title liable as an abstractor, the district court ignored the clear 
and unambiguous terms of Northern Title's title commitment and escrow agreement. Therefore, 
the district court's finding of liability against Northern Title was error, and should be reversed. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY CUMMINGS LEFT THE DISTRICT 
COURT WITH ONLY ONE NUMBER, LEADING TO AN ILLOGICAL 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
A. Even though Cummings left the district court struggling to find any 
damages, such does not justify the district court's k~peculative use of the 
assignment to value the eastern property. 
"The plaintiff, of course, has the burden to prove all elements of [his] negligence claim, 
including damages." Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 567, 181 P.3d 489, 494 (2008); see also 
Glacier Gen. Assur. Co. v. Hisaw, 103 Idaho 605, 608,651 P.2d 539, 542 (1982) (judgment 
cannot be entered absent damages); see also Twin Falls Cm)!. v. Knievel, 98 Idaho 321, 323, 563 
P.2d 45, 47 (1977). Therefore, a plaintiff must prove his amount of damages by a preponderance 
of the evidence. See Hannston v. Agro-West, Inc., III Idaho 814, 821, 727 P.2d 1242,1249 
(1986) (must prove each element by a preponderance). Further, the amount of damages must be 
beyond "conjecture or speCUlation." Mabe v. State ex. rei. Rich, 86 Idaho 254, 262, 385 P.2d 
401,406 (1963) (plaintiff fails to prove damages in condemnation proceeding); see also Harris, 
Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 770264 P.3d 400, 409 (2011) 
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("amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty"); see also Mosell Equities, 
LLC, v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 241, 297 P.3d 232 (2013) ("court cannot grant a 
judgment as to one element of a claim for relief'). 
Here, the district court could compute damages in only one way, which ultimately was 
based on complete speculation: 
The only thing that the Court can say with certainty is that the Stephens 
were willing to sell the property on the west side of the highway for 
$800,000. Cummings was willing to pay an additional $50,000 and 
purchase an assignment from the Baums in order to purchase what he 
believed was the entire Stephens ranch situated on both sides of the 
highway. This belief came based upon the negligent preparation of the 
legal description by Northern Title that identified land on the east side of 
the highway. The only harm that the Court can conclude is outside the 
realm of speculation is that Cummings has been proximately harmed by 
this negligence in an amount of $50,000. 
R., Vol. 8, 1629 (emphasis added). Thus, the district court erroneously reasoned that the value of 
the eastern side, Cummings' alleged loss, was $50,000.00. The record does not support the 
district court's conclusion. The written assignment makes no partition of the property: 
Assignment of the Purchase and Sale Agreement from Roger Stevens to 
Three Bar Ranches, L.L.c. to Steven Cummings. Purchase and sales 
agreement Dated 7-2-07 Id # ES070207B. All terms and purchase price to 
remain the same except Steven Cummings to pay $850,000.00 with 
$50,000.00 going to Three Bar Ranches and the balance to payoff to 
Roger Stephens. All included items + excluded items to remain the same. 
All money paid to be cash at closing. Closing by 8-3-07. 
Baum Assignment, Trial Exhibit 14. Similarly, Cummings' own testimony refutes a piecemeal 
valuation: 
Q. Mr. Cummings, would you put a separate value to the east side? 








Not would he? Did he. 
Did you. Did you put a separate value to the east side? 
I looked at it as a whole. It was what it was .... 
So when you say "$850,000," you're referring to the value to the property 
as a whole. 
That's correct. 
Tr., Vol. 1, 133: 14-134: 15 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, that $50,000 assignment gained Cummings 270 acres on the west, which are not 
at dispute. See Tr., Vol. 1, 793: 1-4. Thus, while Cummings may argue that he never would have 
purchased the assignment absent the eastern property, causation is but one element. See 
McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280, 283, 255 P.3d 1166, 1169 (2011) 
(must be causal connection between conduct and injuries). Cummings' also bore the burden of 
proving his damages beyond mere speculation and conjecture. See Mabe, 86 Idaho at 262,385 
P.2d at 406; see also Harris, Inc., 151 Idaho at 770, 264 P.3d at 409. 
Rather than accept Cummings' failure to prove damages, the district court's sole method 
of valuation was to engage in an illogical calculation. Cummings failed to prove his damages, 
and the Court should order Cummings' claims dismissed. 
B. Cummings' disregard for his duties constitutes contributory negligence; 
furthermore, the district court failed to consider mitigation. 
A plaintiff's action is barred when his negligence is at least as great as the defendant's. 
See I.e. §6-801; see also R., Vol. 4, p. 696 (affirmative defense of contributory negligence). 
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Separate and apart from contributory negligence, the "doctrine of avoidable consequences, or the 
duty to mitigate, is an affirmative defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a 
defendant proves that it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the 
full extent of the damages caused by the defendant's actionable conduct." McCormick Int'I. USA, 
Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 924, 277 P.3d 367, 371 (2012) (citing Davis v. First Interstate 
Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170, 765 P.2d 680, 681 (1988)); see also Third Party 
Defendant's Answer, Vol. 4, 696 (affirmative defense of failure to mitigate). As explained in 
Casey v. Nampa: 
Contributory negligence acts concurrently with that of the defendant. 
They are synchronous in their operation. The carelessness or indifference 
of the plaintiff in the matter of lessening damages [mitigation] is 
successive and subsequent to the carelessness of the defendant. They do 
not take effect at the same time. The defendant's negligence has spent its 
force and is past ... [t]he two are not to be confounded, although in some 
instances the result - that is, the obliteration of damages - may be almost 
identical. 
Casey v. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation Dist., 85 Idaho 299, 306, 379 P.2d 409, 413 (1963) 
(quoting and citing Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 111 Or. 199, 225 P. 202 (1924); 81 A.L.R. 
282; 15 AmJur. Damages § 27; 25 CJ.S. Damages § 32; 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 135). 
I. Based on the allocation of duties and Cummings' own negligence, 
the district court should have found Cummings contributorily 
negligent. 
Cummings' "belief" regarding the eastern side was attributable to his conduct, not 
Northern Title's. As discussed supra, Northern Title produced its commitment to further title 
insurance, and was not Cummings' abstractor. See Anderson, 103 Idaho 875, 878-879, 655 P.2d 
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82, 85-86 (1982) ("Court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer"); 
see also Brown's Tie & Lumber Co., 115 Idaho 56, 764 P.2d 423 (1988); see also Trial Ex. 35; 
see also Trial Ex. 10, bates-stamped 0009, ~ 4 ([t]his commitment is a contract ... and is not an 
abstract of title"); see also Escrow General Provisions, Trial Ex. 111, ~~ 11, 14 (affirms legal 
description, indemnifies Northern Title for lack of survey). 
Additionally, Cummings' alleged belief was a self-created outlier. The district court 
found "[tJhe Stephens had no intention to sell their property located on the east side of the 
highway." R., Vol. 8, p. 1592, ~ 2. Similarly, the realtors had no intention of selling the eastern 
property. Id. at p. 1593, ~ 9. Finally, Northern Title understood the same. Id. at p. 1593, ~ 8. In 
concluding that the eastern property was for sale, Cummings never spoke with Three Bar or 
either of the Stephens Trustees. See Tr., Vol. 1,87: 17-188: 12. He never went to Northern Title. 
Id. at 281 :7-14; see also id. at 298:22-299: 14 (only went to Northern Title regarding desire to 
quitclaim property into his family trust). Rather, all that Cummings did was a "rough" plot of 
Northern Title's deed description, which even he admits, "I wouldn't rely on." Tr., Vol. 1,280: 
9-12. Cummings did not obtain an appraisal; Cummings did not obtain a survey; and Cummings 
did not verify the total acreage. Id. at 187: 17-188: 12; see also id. at 214:24-215:4. Therefore, 
while Northern Title's legal description may have been a catalyst for Cummings' erroneous 
belief, that belief was clearly driven by Cummings' own negligence. 
Cummings' furthered his own negligent belief at closing. Cummings admits that the only 
legal description he ever saw was that in Exhibit 35, containing Northern Title's first erroneous 
title commitment. See Tr., Vol. 1,94:3-9. However, Northern Title had issued a second title 
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commitment. See R., Vol. 9, p. 1595 ~~ 26-27. While the legal description from this second title 
commitment was utilized and provided to Cummings at closing, he admits he did not review the 
closing documents. See Tr., Vol. 1,94:5-6 (only aware of first title commitment); see also id. at 
220:25-221: 10 (Cummings does not dispute second title commitment deed description used at 
closing); see also id. at 88:4-19 (Cummings only did "cursory review" of closing documents). 
Further, Cummings admits that if he had seen this second legal description, which was included 
in the closing documents, such would have been a "major red tlag." Id. at 226: 12-14. In other 
words, Cummings' erroneous belief came as the result of his own, self-imposed negligence, not 
Northern Title. 
The district court's award of damages was barred by Cummings' contributory negligence. 
Cummings' alleged belief, wrought through his own negligence, was not Northern Title's fault. 
ii. Rather than acknowledge his mistake, Cummings avoided the 
parties, and even when the opportunity arose, refused to mitigate 
his damages. 8 
The duty to mitigate "provides that a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of the 
defendant, is ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by 
reasonable acts." Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170, 765 P.2d 
680, 681 (1988). The doctrine seeks to "discourage even persons against whom wrongs have 
8 While the trial court failed to address mitigation of damages in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the issue of mitigation, with arguments in support, were provided in 
Northern Title's Post Trial Brief, and pled as an affirmative defense. See R., Vol. 8, pp. 1566-
1567; see also R., Vol. 4, p. 696 (Affirmative Def. No.8). 
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been committed from passively suffering economic loss which could be averted by reasonable 
efforts .... " Indus. Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96 Idaho 574, 577, 532 P.2d 916, 919 (1974). 
First, Cummings avoided the consequences of his negligent belief. By November of 
2007, Cummings admits "1 received a message from Stephens that changes were made to the 
Warranty Deed." Tr., Vol. 1,322:9-11; see also Cummings' Affidavit, Trial Ex. 49, <j[ 6. 
Similarly in November of 2007, Cummings received a letter from Roger Stephens, stating "I had 
to go to Northern Title and found that they had made a mistake on the land description .... " Id. 
at 342: 12-16; see also Stephen's Nov. 27, 2007 Ltr., Trial Ex. 21. The district court also found 
that prior to recording the corrected warranty deed, Northern Title left Cummings a voicemail. 
See R., Vol. 8, p. 1596, ~ 37. 
However, Cummings did not respond to Stephens. Nor did Cummings seek out the 
Realtors, nor Northern Title. Rather, Cummings located someone he had never spoken with, 
Curtis Baum of Three Bar. See Tr., 187:2-13 (having never met the Baums prior thereto, 
Cummings sought out and took "Mr. Buam" to lunch); see also id. at 187:17-188:12 (Cummings 
did not go to Stephens). Allegedly, Cummings sought Baum to "get clarity on what the 
agreement between the buyer and the seller was." Id. at 324:3-7. Months later on February 29, 
2008, Cummings finally responded to Northern Title, but made no mention of the corrected 
warranty deed. Id. at 531 :21-24; see also Trial Ex. 41. Then on March 27,2008, Cummings 
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again sent letter to Northern Title, and while he admits by this time he "clearly knew" about the 
changed warranty deed, said nothing of it. See Tr., VoL 1,326:22-327:5; See also Trial Ex. 43.9 
Cummings' knew his negligence had led to his outlier belief, and so he went "dark" in 
hopes of figuring a version of the transaction that would work best for him. However, 
Cummings' conduct was directly contrary to the Escrow General Provisions, wherein he agreed 
to "cooperate and adjust clerical errors, and or further documentation which may be deemed 
necessary to comply with any Real Estate Purchase Contract governing this transaction or it's 
[sic] intent." See Escrow Genera/ Provisions, Trial Ex. 111, ~ 20. Rather than comply with 
these provisions, Cummings strove to get more than he should. 10 
Thus under these circumstances, it is strange that the district court did not address the 
issue of mitigation. Assuming, arguendo, that Cummings proved the value of the eastern side, 
and that the district court did not violate the Anderson rule, Cummings did nothing to alleviate 
his alleged damages. First, Cummings never investigated the real estate market to look for 
replacement property. See Tr., VoL 1,259:14-19. Second, un-refuted testimony, admitted 
without objection, shows Cummings had the ability to mitigate all his alleged property damages: 
A. When -- after Mr. Cummings had purchased the property and I 
heard that there were some problems, I told him -- or I wrote him. 
But I did let him know that there were people that were interested 
in buying that for the same price that he did if he wanted to get out. 
9 Letter wherein Cummings demands his title policy. 
10 Disturbingly, when Cummings admitted that his own inspection of the deed description failed 
to identify the Romwell and Lui properties (neither of which belonged to the Stephens Trust) 
Cummings claimed Northern Title should pay him for that too. See Tr., Vol. 1,542:7-20; id. at 
275:22-276:10; see also id. at 277:2-10. 
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Q. And did you hear a response from him in that regard? 
A. No. He just -- no, he didn't respond. 
Q. Okay. And is that, in fact, the case, you believe you had buyers 
that would be willing to pay him the same amount he paid for the 
property? 
A. After he bought it, there were people that were coming in with 
their advertising that, yes, indicated they would have been 
interested for it at that price. 
Q. Okay. Did Mr. Cummings ever approach you with any interest to 
sell? 
A. No. 
Tr., Vol. 1, 799: 16-800:8 (testimony by realtor Skinner) (emphasis added). Therefore, 
Cummings' conduct violated the law of mitigation, where a plaintiff may not passively suffer 
reasonably avoidable economic loss. Indus. Leasing Corp., 96 Idaho at 577,532 P.2d at 919. 
Though Cummings could have taken steps to avoid his alleged damages, he did nothing. 
The district court erred when it failed to address mitigation. Cummings isolated himself, 
refused to cooperate, and shirked the opportunity to re-sell the property at the same price. The 
Court should dismiss Cummings' award of damages. 
III. CONTRARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE AND WILLFUL MISCONDUCT, NORTHERN TITLE 
WAS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED TO FILE A CORRECTED 
WARRANTY DEED. 
An escrow is responsible for those "duties and powers limited to the terms of the escrow 
agreement." Foreman v. Todd, 83 Idaho 482, 485, 364 P.2d 365,366 (1961) (quoting Nickell v. 
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Reser, 143 Kan. 831,57 P.2d 101, 103 (1936)). As such, an escrow may "be looked upon as a 
special agent of both parties, with powers limited only to those stipulated in the escrow 
agreement ... [who] acts by virtue of his own powers, and not as the agent of anybody." 
Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486, 364 P.2d at 367 (quoting 19 Am.Jur., Escrow, § 13, p. 430). As such, 
the escrow is "the trustee of an express trust with duties to perform for each of the parties, which 
duties neither can forbid without the consent of the other." Id. 
To hold Northern Title liable, the district court disregarded the unambiguous terms of the 
Escrow General Provisions. The first deed was filed on August 3,2007, which enoneously 
failed to properly place the "exception" language on top, excluding all eastern property. See R., 
Vol. 8, p. 1596, ~~ 32-33. 11 In November of 2007, Mr. Stephens informed Northern Title of the 
error. Id. at ~ 34. Prior to filing the corrective deed, Northern Title strove to get in touch with 
Cummings, but was only able to leave a voicemail.ld.at ~ 37; see also Tr., Vol. 1,537:8-13 and 
538:14-23 (tried several times, and even after leaving message for Cummings regarding inconect 
deed, still did not hear back for three months). Unable to reach Cummings, 12 Northern Title filed 
the conective warranty deed. Id. at ~ 35; see also Trial Ex. 22. 
The district court was incensed with Northern Title, holding Northern Title's failure "to 
get Cummings' authorization prior to altering the legal description and recording a wananty 
11 Notably, the Court failed to recognize that the legal description used at closing still 
erroneously contained property that did not belong to the Stephen Family Trust, namely the Lui 
property. See Tr., Vol. 1, 543: 10-14. 
12 Prior to recording the corrected deed, Northern Title had been trying to get a hold of 
Cummings to facilitate the placement of the property into his family trust, but received no 
response. See Tr., Vol. 1,530: 16-25. 
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deed containing a legal description that was altered from the title commitment legal description 
that the parties had agreed upon constitutes gross negligence ... [t]here was not the slightest 
degree of care shown when Northern Title recorded the warranty deed." R., Vol. 8, p. 1605. The 
crux of the district court's holding was based, quite simply, on the erroneous fact that Northern 
Title failed to act under Cummings' "authorization." Id. at Vol. 8, p. 1604-1605. 
In reality, Cummings' authorization did not matter. What mattered was the joint 
authorization of the parties. An escrow is "a special agent of both parties ... [who] acts by 
virtue of his own powers, and not as the agent of anybody." Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486,364 P.2d 
at 367 (quoting 19 Am.Jur., Escrow, § 13, p. 430). As Lenore Katri explained, the Escrow 
General Provisions are the joint instructions of the parties. See Tr., Vol. 1,662:9-663:9. 
Similarly, the Foreman Court held that the "[dJuties of an escrow holder are those set out in the 
escrow agreement." Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486,364 P.2d at 367. 
Here, the district court's finding was contrary to Northern Title's authority. Northern 
Title was expressly authorized to receive instructions from the realtors through whom Cummings 
had dealt, and to record documents that comport with those instructions: 
The parties authorize Escrow Agent to close the transaction, record 
documents, disburse funds, and otherwise act in accordance with the 
written Settlement Statement and any written or oral directions or 
agreements given to Escrow agent by the parties or their representatives. 
The parties agree that Escrow Agent is entitled to act on the direction of 
the realtor, attorney or other person who has dealt with Escrow Agent on 
behalf of them in this transaction. If any party wishes to limit the 
authority of those who have dealt on their behalf with Escrow Agent, any 
such limitation must be contained in writing. 
Trial Ex. 111, <Ji 2 (emphasis added). 
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First, Cummings used the realtors to deal with Northern Title. Prior to closing, 
Cummings never met with Stephens or Three Bar Ranches. According to Cummings, he worked 
exclusively through Skinner: 
Q: All right. During the period of the transaction, did you 
have any direct contact with Mr. Stephens, the Seller'? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you have any direct contact with any of the principals 
for Three Bar Ranches? 
A: No. 
Q: So all your negotiations with them were though - was it 
Evan Skinner? 
A: Yes. 
Tr., Vol. 1, 98:21-99:5; see also id. at 187: 17-188:2; see also id. at 210:2-12. Additionally, 
Cummings used the realtors when it came to obtaining the legal description: 
Q: The legal description is one of the documents - one of the three or four 
documents you were asking for? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: And you continued to follow up with the realtors in that regard? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: But at this point in time you had not correspondence with Northern Title? 
A: At this juncture? 
Q: Yes. 
A: I do not believe so. 
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Tr., VoL 1,311 :9-20. Similarly, Cummings testified he relied on the realtors for determining 
acreage. ld. at p. 214, L. 20-21. Further, Cummings testified that he received the title 
commitment from the realtors, not Northern Title.ld. at p. 187, L. 21-23. 
Second, Northern Title had received unequivocal instructions from the realtors. After 
Cummings was already involved,13 Julian came to Northern Title and demanded to know 
whether the deed description excluded all eastern property: 
So at the end of the month, you always have a lot of closings. But we sent 
it [the first title commitment] out, and a few days later, after the weekend, 
Dorothy Julian came into my office, and she walked right in, and she 
knocked on my desktop, and she said -- dropped it on the desktop, and she 
said, "Does this description except out the east side of the highway?" And 
I looked at it, and I told her, "I will call the title officer." And she was 
standing there, I called the title officer. She went over it Barbara [the 
title officer] said, "No, It's missing. I need to get that put in. I'll put it in 
and get it sent back out" So she sent back out an updated title 
commitment 
Tr., VoL 1, 518: 13-25. Indeed, the district court held that it was "quite clear" to Northern Title 
that the sale included only that property west of the Highway. R., VoL 8, p. 1593, ~~ 8-9; see 
also Tr., VoL 1,817:3-818:11 (sale only included west); see also Julian Published Depo., p. 20: 
13-20, 21: 14-17, 36: 15-22, 38: 16-24, and 40: 19-41 :3 (sale only included west). 
Thus in a transaction that took less than a week, where Cummings relied on the realtors 
to deal with Northern Title, Northern Title was obligated to rely on its realtor's instructions and 
"record documents" in accordance with those instructions. See Escrow General Provisions, Trial 
13 See Tr., VoL 1, 519:3-4 and 519: 12-22; see also id. at 520:21-521:9 (first title commitment 
sent July 26,2007; correction detected a "couple of days" after); see also id. at 94:5-6 (receipt of 
first title commitment by Cummings on July 26, 2007). 
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Ex. 11 I, 11 2. This authority was something neither Cummings, nor the Stephens Trust, could 
forbid. See Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486,364 P.2d at 367 (escrow has duties to perform for each of 
the parties, which duties neither can forbid without the consent of the other"). 
Third, once Northern Title learned of the clerical error, Northern Title had authority to 
correct the deed. The Escrow General Provisions expressly contemplated corrective authority: 
The undersigned hereby further agree, if required by closing agent, to 
cooperate and adjust clerical errors, and or further documentation which 
may be deemed necessary to comply with any Real Estate Purchase 
Contract governing this transaction and its intent. 
Escrow General Provisions, Trial Ex. 111, <JI 20 (emphasis added). As the Foreman Court held, 
Northern Title "is not concerned with nor responsible for defects in the title to the property." 
Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486,364 P.2d at 367. Rather as was the case here, Northern Title was 
concerned with following its instructions: 
Q: Is it your job to figure out what the intent of the contract is? 
A: No, but I can rely on my realtors' instructions. 
Tr., Vol. 1,468:16-18 (Thornock on behalf of Northern Title). 
Finally to make the correction, Cummings's signature was immateriaL As the Idaho 
Court of Appeals explains, "[t]he doctrine of relation back permits a party to a conveyance of 
real property to correct an erroneous legal description in the original deed by filing a subsequent 
or correction deed; the correction then becomes effective as of the date of the original deed." 
Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 272, 775 P.2d 161, 164 (Idaho App. 
1989). (emphasis in original). Northern Title shared this understanding. See Tr., VoL 1,471: 16-
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20. Northern Title knew that the deed description failed to comport with the realtors' 
instructions. Additionally, the Escrow General Provisions had given Northern Title corrective 
authority. Escrow General Provisions, Trial Ex. Ill, lJI 20. Further, Northern Title had obtained 
a grantors' permission when Stephens' reported the error. Therefore, Northern Title was fully 
authorized to record a correction deed that comported with its joint instructions. 
The district court's holding of gross negligence against Northern Title is contrary to the 
express terms of the Escrow General Provisions. Northern Title acted in good faith and in 
accordance with the written joint Escrow General Provisions. Where Northern Title was merely 
striving to fulfill its joint instructions, 14 Cummings "must look to [his] grantors, not to the 
depository nor its officer, for title." Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486,364 P.2d at 367. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY IGNORED NORTHERN 
TITLE'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE, AND NORTHERN TITLE SHOULD 
BE DEEMED A PREVAILING PARTY. 
Under the law of the prevailing party, "courts must not ignore the value of a successful 
defense." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 
117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). Therefore, "the prevailing party question is examined and determined 
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Id. Three principal factors guide a district 
court when determining "which party, if any, prevailed: (I) the final judgment or result obtained 
in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the 
parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues." 
14 See Tr., Vol. 1,468:16-18 (Northern Title testifying not its job to figure out the intent of the 
transaction, and that it could rely on the realtors' instructions). 
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Nguyen v. But, 146 Idaho 187,192,1941 P.3d 1107, 1112 (2008) (citing Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. 
Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 261-62, 999 P.2d 914, 916-17 (Ct. App. 2000); 
Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411,659 P.2d 160, 165 (CL App. 1983». 
Further, a district court "may not use the award or denial of attorney fees to vindicate his 
sense of justice beyond the judgment rendered on the underlying dispute between the parties." 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at720, 117 P.3d at 134 (quoting Evans v. Sawtooth 
Partners, III Idaho 381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931 (Ct. App. 1986». 
The district court's award to Cummings of all his attorney fees, based on one successful 
claim, was improper. In his Second Anwnded Complaint, Cummings brought nine (9) causes of 
action against Northern Title, including (I) Breach of Warranty, (2) Conversion, (3) Slander of 
Title, (4) Breach of Contract, 15 (5) Per Se Violations of the Idaho Escrow Act, (6) Breach of 
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 16 (7) Negligence or Gross Negligence,17 (8) Breach of 
Insurance Policy Agreement, and (9) Intliction of Emotional Distress. See R., Vol. 4, pp. 574-
649. After Cummings rested his case, the district court granted Northern Title's request to 
dismiss Counts I and II for Breach of Warranty and Conversion. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1589. ns That 
is a successful defense. 
15 Cummings' breach of contract claim against Northern Title as Escrow Agent for rerecording 
the deed, <Jf<Jf 64-67. 
16 Cummings' bad faith tort claim against Northern Title, <Jf<Jf 73-81. 
17 Cummings' tort claim against Northern Title for rerecording the deed, <Jf<Jf 82-86. 
18 The district court also entered its Minute Entry & Order on this matter, which Cummings has 
not included on appeal; notwithstanding, Cummings does not raise or contest the district court's 
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After trial, the court dismissed five (5) more of Cummings' counts against Northern Title. 
See R., at Vol. 8, p. 1635. 19 Through Northern Title's testimony, Cummings' claim for Slander 
of Title lacked malice. ld.at Vol. 8, pp. 1599-1600. Through Northern Title's affirmative 
defense, Cummings' Negligence Per Se claim was barred by the express terms of the Escrow 
General Provisions.ld. at Vol. 8, pp. 1607-1608; see also R., Vol. 4, 678. 20 Cummings' Breach 
of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claim was dismissed where Northern Title successfully 
argued that a tort of bad faith does not exist against an Escrow, and proved at trial that Northern 
Title had disputed Cummings' claims in good faith. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1608-1616. Cummings' 
Breach of Insurance Policy claim was also dismissed based on Northern Title's eleventh (11 til) 
and twentieth (20th) affirmative defenses, for lack of privity and failure to join indispensable 
parties.ld. at Vol. 8, pp. 1612-1615, 1624; see R., Vol. 4, p. 696-697.21 In the end, the district 
court could only find damages against Northern Title for one claim, based on negligence in 
drafting the title commitment deed description. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1629.22 That is a successful 
defense. 
Rule 41 (b) dismissals in favor of Northern Title. 
19 Dismissing claims of Slander of Title, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing, Breach of Insurance Policy Agreement, and Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
20 Northern Title's Fifth Affirmative Defense. 
21 Northern Title's Eleventh and Twentieth Affirmative Defenses. 
22 Which, as discussed supra, was entirely speculative and violated the Anderson rule. 
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Indeed Cummings failed to prove the gravamen of his case. Cummings argued as 
follows: 
[T]he written agreement for escrow services . . . was integral to 
Cummings' claim, or constituting the 'gravamen' of the lawsuit. The 
Court held that Northern Title breached that contract ... [and by] 
prevailing on these claims, Cummings is allowed a reasonable attorney 
fee. 
R., Vol. 8, p. 1639-1640. However, to succeed on a claim for breach of contract, Cummings was 
required to prove damages. For instance in Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, 
Inc., the court "found Harris' evidence too speculative to attribute any amount of damages." 
Harris, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 769, 264 P.3d 400, 408 (2011). Therefore, "Harris' contract action 
against Johnson fails because Harris failed to prove up its claim for damages." Harris, Inc., 151 
Idaho at 770,264 P.3d at 409. Similarly in Burns v. County of Boundary, the Court of Appeals 
explained that the district court should "consider the presence and absence of awards of 
affirmative relief and determine which party, on balance, prevailed in the action." Burns, 120 
Idaho 623, 626, 818 P.2d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis). Cummings's failure to prove 
any damages on the gravamen of his case should have weighed heavily in Northern Title's favor, 
but the district court refused to acknowledge any of Northern Title's success. 
Even more disturbing, the district court appears to have used it discretion in order to 
punish Northern Title. As explained in Eighteen Mile Ranch, a "court may not use the award or 
denial of attorney fees to vindicate his sense of justice beyond the judgment rendered on the 
underlying dispute between the parties." 141 Idaho at 720, 117 P.3d at 134 (citation omitted). As 
set forth in Northern Title's Memorandum of Fees and Costs, Brad Bearnson initially represented 
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Stephens as co-counsel, but discontinued his representation of Stephens after Northern Title 
became a party. See R., Vol. 9, pp. 1681-1682. During that time period, Mr. Bearnson and 
Bearnson & Caldwell incurred $35,575.84 in defending Stephens. [d. However, even though 
Stephens was deemed the prevailing party, the district court refused to award Bearnson & 
Caldwell any fees incurred on Stephens' behalf. 
The district court specifically asked and was informed that there was no duplication in 
fees claimed by Stephens counsel, Mr. Budge and Mr. Bearnson. See Tr., Vol. 2, 1314:8-21. 
However, the district court also knew that Northern Title had agreed to indemnify Stephens, and 
that Northern Title would be responsible to pay his attorney fees. See Tr., Vol. I, 725:3-5; see 
also id. at 739: 19-22; see also id. at 740:8-11. After knowing these facts, the district court 
summarily held "I'm not going to award Mr. Bearnson's fees." Tr., Vol. 2,1326:9-10. The 
district court's award of all fees to Mr. Budge, and denial of all fees to Mr. Bearnson, even 
though both were legitimately incurred to defend Stephens, was clearly to punish Northern Title. 
Notwithstanding, based upon this appeal, Northern Title is clearly the prevailing party. 
As explained in Eighteen Mile Ranch, "while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be 
more exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must 
not ignore the value of a successful defense." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 
P.3d at 133. In that case, one defendant was dismissed on directed verdict, and another "escaped 
all liability" after defending himself through the entire trial. [d. at 141 Idaho at 719-720, 117 
P.3d at 133. As such, these parties were "clearly prevailing parties." /d.; see also Willie v. Bd. of 
Trs., 138 Idaho 131,59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002) (they "are the prevailing party because they have 
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received all relief sought in their answer"); see also Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 
823,827 (2000) (court abused its discretion where the defendant obtained "the most favorable 
outcome that could possibly be achieved by [the] defendant"). 
The sole relief Cummings sought against Northern Title was damages. See Feb. 26 Hrg. 
IT., 1340:7-11. In fact at trial, the only relief Cummings sought from any of the parties, was 
damages: 
Q: In your deposition when we discussed damage with you, your 
comment was you only wanted the land. Is that still your 
testimony? 
A: Not at this point. 
Q: What is your testimony? What are you seeking from the Court? 
A: For me, I would collect on the policy and move on with my life. 
Tr., Vol. 1,335:7-14. Cummings did not bring suite to quiet title, or even bring suit against the 
actual property owner, the Stephens Family Trust. Id. at p. 728: 15-729:23.23 
Even though his suit was only for damages, Cummings failed to prove any damages. As 
explained supra, the district court's $50,000 damage award was illogical, where even under the 
district court's own findings, Cummings paid $50,000 to obtain the entire property, not just the 
east side. See R., Vol. 8, p. 1594, 11 21; see also Tr., Vol. 1, 133: 14-134: 15 (Cummings valued 
the property "as a whole"). Additionally, the district court's damage award violates the 
Anderson rule, where Northern Title did not provide its title commitment as an abstractor. Id. at 
23 Similarly, Cummings did not bring suit against the expressly stated title insurer, Stewart 
Guaranty. See R., Vol 8, p. 1629. Cummings' does not appeal his error on this point. 
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387:24-391:16. Therefore, despite years of litigation and a four-day trial, Cummings failed to 
prove any damages. Under such circumstances, Northern Title has obtained the most favorable 
outcome possible, and clearly prevailed. See Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719-720, 
117 P.3d at 133 (defendant who survived trial with no liability prevailed); see also Glacier Gen. 
As'sur, Co., 103 Idaho at 608,651 P.2d at 542 Uudgment cannot be entered absent damages). 
Therefore, based on Northern Title's successful defense, it is the prevailing party and 
should be awarded its attorney fees and costs. As Cummings admits, this dispute falls under the 
purview of Idaho Code section 12-120(3). See Appellant's Brief, 47. Under that statute, once a 
prevailing party is determined, Northern Title "shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
set by the court." I.e. § 12-120(3). Similarly, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides costs as a matter of course. 
Additionally under the Escrow General Provisions, "[i]f an action is brought involving 
this escrow and/or Escrow Agent, the parties agree to indemnify and hold the Escrow Agent 
harmless against liabilities, damages, and costs incurred by Escrow Agent (including reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs) except to the extent that such liabilities, damages and costs were 
caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of Escrow Agent." Escrow General 
Provisions, Trial Ex. Ill, <J[ 17. As explained supra, Northern Title did not breach the Escrow 
General Provisions, but regardless, that gravamen of Cummings' case failed when he failed to 
prove damages. See Harris, Inc., 151 Idaho at 770264 P.3d at 409 (holding plaintiff's contract 
action failed absent proof of damages); see also R., Vol. 8, pp. 1626-1627 (Cummings failed to 
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prove damages in connection with escrow agreement). Therefore, under statute, contract and 
rule, Northern Title should be awarded its trial fees and costs. 
Even without this appeal, Northern Title prevailed with a very successful defense. With 
this appeal if Northern Title prevails, it is clearly the prevailing party. Therefore, the Court 
should deem Northern Title a prevailing party, accompanied therewith an order for determination 
of its trial fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Cummings' reliance upon Northern Title's deed description violated the Anderson rule. 
Northern Title's providing of a title commitment did not transmute its duties to those of an 
abstractor, even if the parties ultimately elected to use that deed description at closing. 
Additionally, Cummings was expressly informed under the title commitment and the Escrow 
General Provisions that Northern Title was not his abstractor. Therefore, the Court should 
reverse the district court's negligence and damages findings against Northern Title. 
Notwithstanding, the sole amount of damages citable by the district court runs afoul to 
the law of causation and damages, where the $50,000 was clearly not paid to obtain only the 
eastern property. Additionally, it was Cummings' mass negligence that created his outlier belief, 
and he failed to mitigate damages despite available offers. Therefore again, the Court should 
reverse the district court's award of damages, and order the matter dismissed. 
Further, the district court should not have found Northern Title grossly negligent under 
the Escrow General Provisions. Northern Title was expressly authorized to record documents 
that comported with its realtors' instructions, and to make clerical corrections to ensure the same. 
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should be awarded fees and costs. The district 
court improperly disregarded Northern Title's substantial defenses, and should Northern Title 
prevail on appeal, it will have obtained "the most favorable outcome" possible. 
//~-
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